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The ‘National Security
Strategy of the USA’ and
Brazilian Military Thought:
Imagining the Near Future
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the
fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribu-
tion of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help
create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet
the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system. This is the best way to provide enduring secu-
rity for the American people. National Security Strategy of the United
States of America 2006(p. 6)1
Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military
strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with
our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for
unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power
that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all
societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of
political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be
able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by
fighting terrorists and tyrants. National Security Strategy of the Uni-
ted States of America 2002
O inimigo...é os Estados Unidos. Brigadier General Sérgio Ferolla2
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It is extraordinarily difficult to analyse the political thought
of a military establishment as diverse and carefully regulated
as that of the Forças Armadas Brasileiras.  Several problems
immediately intrude:  1) typically, the opinions of senior milita-
ry officers cannot be expressed legally because of regulations;3
2) such views are part of a dynamic process, constantly chan-
ging and adapting; and 3) there are always at least several
major political camps within a national officer corps, compli-
cating even the presumption that there might be a single Brazi-
lian military position on most topics.  Nonetheless, we can iden-
tify broad military themes over the past three decades, inclu-
ding an emphasis upon nationalism,4  and the defence of Brazi-
lian national sovereignty.  Moreover, the military establishment
has been able to identify spokesmen, be they retired officers or
members of the Military Supreme Court.  Hence, the following
study will seek to “imagine,” based upon a very few public sta-
tements by such spokespeople and commentators, and the
implications of US policy that directly suggests specific US tre-
atment of the all-important concepts of national sovereignty
and world order.
As the US presidential administration of George W. Bush
begins to fade and metamorphose at the end of its second four-
year term, its possible impact upon Brazilian military thought,
given the emergence over the past two decades of profound
distrust and concern with US security policy in the Hemisphe-
re, should be of major interest to both policy analysts and ob-
servers of regional politics. Specifically, the emphases of the
National Security Strategies of the United States of America of
2002 and 2006, the “Bush Doctrine,” upon just war and pre-
emptive military attack,5  on unilateralism, on limiting posses-
sion of at least some middle-range powers of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), and upon qualified democracy/freedom
and national security appear at first glance to put the Brazilian
military in a quandary. In their emphasis upon US national se-
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curity and external military intervention these policies could be
regarded as posing a threat to the autonomy, if not the national
sovereignty, of middle-range powers (including Brazil), and of
avoiding enough references to international law sufficient to
put military minds at ease.  In stressing the importance of de-
mocracy and freedom as natural antidotes to terrorism, they
might be accused of interfering in the internal political affairs
of sovereign nations, even if they are thought to be in a good
cause. Nonetheless, observers are increasingly speaking of the
end of a single US strategy for Latin America, arguing, rather,
that “US-Latin American relations today are simply the sum of
many different bilateral relationships.”6
The attack on New York’s Twin Towers and the Pentagon,
on September 11, 2001, created a new argument for unilateral
US actions in support of “world order,” a term that had been
pioneered by George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s under the
nomenclature of the “New World Order.”  By most accounts,
the September 11 attacks should not have been a transforming
development, except perhaps in their scope. Terrorist attacks,
particularly in Europe, had become commonplace decades ago.
This was, however, a defining event as regarded the number of
deaths, the extent of the destruction, the iconic structures tar-
geted, and the central and growing concern of the administra-
tion of George W. Bush that US military hegemony was threa-
tened, and yet was vital to worldwide economic and political
goals. As a result, two declarations of US national strategy,
incorporated into numerous policies and policy justifications,
have emerged to explain and support the subsequent invasions
and overthrow of the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq and
the worldwide US war on terror, the “National Security Strate-
gy of the United States of America, 2002” (NSS02), and the
“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
2006” (NSS06).  While the NSSs, by most accounts, have had
little direct impact on US-Brazilian relations, the following study
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will examine some of the possible impacts of these broad-rea-
ching strategies, the so-called “Bush Doctrine,” on Brazilian
military thought in the Twenty-First Century, imagining, as it
were the responses of senior military opinion leaders who are
forbidden by regulation from speaking their minds.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES, 2002 AND 2006
The hypnotic power of ideologies, which, as Karl Mannheim
put it so well, function more like busses than taxis—they take
their adherents along a prescribed route, often ill suited to
their (or their country’s) needs.7  The NSSs of 2002 and 2006,
increasingly regarded as the heart of the “Bush Doctrine,” and
published on the White House web page,8  have been seemin-
gly captured by an ideological tenor, if not clearly identifiable
ideological content, and hence have transported US foreign
policy to an apparently new paradigm, if not new territory.
Meanwhile, Brazilian military thought over the past two de-
cades has been adjusting to a new international configurati-
on, a new domestic political arena, and a decidedly new ap-
proach to its dealings with the United States.  The need to
clarify and situate the NSSs, then, is underscored.  The follo-
wing pages will undertake this task in the unique and signifi-
cant Brazilian military context.
Writing in the Revista Marítima Brasileira in 2004 about the
first US NSS and subsequent invasion and overthrow of gover-
nments in Afghanistan and Iraq, Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr
noted that:
Dentre vários outros a NSS chama a atenção para quatro importan-
tes tópicos; As ações militares preventivas, a construção de um
poder militar forte o bastante para não ser desafiado, um compro-
misso multilateral deixando claro a unilateralidade se assim a na-
ção achar necessário e o objetivo de espalhar a democracia e os
direitos humanos por todo o mundo.9
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As will become clear shortly, each of these concerns, parti-
cularly the justification of preemptive military attack, unilate-
ralism, and the maintenance of a military establishment that
is beyond challenge, are regarded as officious in contempora-
ry Brazilian military thought, and would be amplified and bro-
adened in NSS ’06.  The concept of “rogue states,” likewise
expressed in the NSSs, seems to lack conceptual precision,
and hence is susceptible to broad application. As Christine
Gray, Professor of International Law at the University of Cam-
bridge, noted in 2006 in the Chinese Journal of International
Law,10  there is one other important concern: unlike the EU
2003 Security Strategy,11  the 2006 NSS strangely made no re-
ference to international law.12   We will now briefly examine
each of these considerations in turn in an effort to understand
their possible impact, through the influence of the NSSs, on
Brazilian military thought.
Growing Emphasis upon Pre-emptive
Military Actions and Unilateralism
The presumption of “just war doctrine” and the right of pre-
emptive military attack13  have long been argued by philoso-
phers of international relations.  The NSSs tackle these delicate
questions rather awkwardly.  In the 2006 document, President
Bush asserts in an opening letter that:
This Administration has chosen the path of confidence.  We choo-
se leadership over isolation, and the pursuit of free and fair trade
and open markets over protectionism.  We choose to deal with
challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations.
We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive
in this country.  We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped
by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their
mercy (italics added).14
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The 2002 document was very direct in raising unilateral ri-
ghts to pre-emptive attacks, implied threats to national sove-
reignty of other countries, a special status accorded to Wea-
pons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and the use of “terrorism”
as a separate and almost unassailable category:
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:
•Direct and continuous action using all the elements of national
and international power.  Our immediate focus will be those terrorist
organizations of global reach and any terrorist of state sponsor of
terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) or their precursors;
•Defending the United States, the American people, and our interes-
ts at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat be-
fore it reaches our borders.  While the United States will constantly
strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will
not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent
them from doing harm against our people and our country; and
•Denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists
by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign res-
ponsibilities.15
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, the
United States argued that military pre-emption fell far short of
the criteria of “just war,” and thereby opened that ancient and
difficult concept.  A (US) Brookings Institution policy study no-
tes that the NSS concept of pre-emption “is not limited to the
traditional definition…—striking  an enemy as it prepares to
attack—but also includes prevention—striking an enemy in the
absence of specific evidence of a coming attack.”16   Moreover,
it is clear that pre-emptive military strikes virtually always vi-
olate international law, and in this regard NSS 2002 “fails to
distinguish between eliminating dangerous capabilities and
overthrowing dangerous regimes,”17  a rather serious omission
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for military establishments considering the international legal
implications as regards their own national sovereignty, as will
be seen below. Moreover, the assumption that other states can-
not adopt a policy of pre-emption underscores the US rejection
of international law as it might be said to apply equally to all
countries.18    Additionally, the Bush Doctrine, expressed as a
response to a perceived threat by “rogue states” with “wea-
pons of mass destruction” (WMDs), deliberately avoids precise
definitions in each of these difficult concepts.  As Gray notes for
example, while the definition of the pre-emptive “use of force in
the 2006 Strategy is no more detailed than it had been in
2002,”19  the definition of “rogue states” seems to have chan-
ged from Iraq (now occupied) and North Korea to Iran and
Syria.20  They are clearly capable of changing again in subse-
quent iterations.
The implications of these changes for Brazilian military thou-
ght are relatively straightforward.  The Bush Administration
documents assume that the United States must be called upon
to act unilaterally in defence of world order, although some
care is made in the documents to deny this.21   In fact, the pre-
sumption of NSS 2002 and 2006 that the US must combat ter-
rorism worldwide is fundamentally posited as primarily a uni-
lateral duty, to be shared only if possible.   In fact, as Daniel
Cruz de Andrade Flôr notes,
A busca por um multilateralismo que dissimulasse a dominação
norte-americana, facilitando intercâmbios e prevenindo coalizões
anti-hegemônicas, foi encarada pelos republicanos como uma fra-
queza democrata.22
Any rationale in support of US intervention in the affairs/
territory of middle-range powers be they currently defined “ro-
gue states” or not, has immediate resonance as regards the
Amazon region. For example, references in the NSSs to stabili-
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ty in Colombia are readily associated with previous cross-bor-
der incidents in the Amazon as well as a major attempt to
foment a Brazilian PT/FARC scandal as late as 2005. As Vice-
Almirante Vidigal notes, “O grande problema associado com a
dourtrina específica da ação preemptiva está no fato de que
outros países podem querer seguir o exemplo do Estados Uni-
dos.”23   The actual US proposal of pre-emption, moreover, has
been argued as better described as prevention.  This would be
no better from an international legal standpoint, however, and
perhaps even more threatening to a Brazilian military establish-
ment, for as Lawrence Freedman has noted,
Prevention is cold blooded: it intends to deal with a problem before
it becomes a crisis.  Prevention can be seen as pre-emption in slow
motion, more anticipatory or forward thinking, perhaps even looking
beyond the targets’s current intentions to those that might develop
along with greatly enhanced capabilities.24
As defenders of a middle-range power reportedly with nu-
clear weapons technology, the Brazilian armed forces would
justifiably see a proximate threat in this surgical notion of
prevention.
Terrorism as an iconic threat — and islam
The opening lines of a section in NSS 2006 entitled “The Way
Ahead,” insists that:
The struggle against militant Islamic radicalism is the great ideolo-
gical conflict of the early years of the 21st century and finds the great
powers all on the same side—opposing the terrorists.  This circums-
tance differs profoundly from the ideological struggles of the 20th
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The central focus of NSS 2006 is combating terrorism, with
Section III devoted almost exclusively to the subject.  Key poli-
cy points include:
•Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur.
•Deny WMD to rogues states and to terrorist allies who would use
them without     hesitation.
•Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states.
•Deny terrorists control over any nation that they would use as a
base and launching pad for terror.
•America will lead this fight and we will continue to partner with
allies and recruit new friends to join the battle.26
The nature of the international threat of terrorism has been
characterised by association with specific and related groups,
primarily Islamic Fundamentalists, although there are abun-
dant references to other groups (and states) that might also fit
this category.27   The case of Iraq, and the US invasion and over-
throw of Saddam Hussein, is particularly sensitive to Brazili-
am military thinkers.  Writing in the Brazilian Navy Journal,
Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr summarised the conflicting possi-
ble motivations for the Iraqi invasion, and concluded that after
that invasion:
Aqueles que antes apoiavam os Estados Unidos no combate contra
o terrorismo e os responsáveis pelos atentados de 11 de setembro
passaram a se mostrar contrarios aos discursos e opções norte-
americanas.28
The Brazilian military’s close traditional relationship with
Iraq, and the manner in which that government was over-
thrown, cannot but have had a major impact on Brazilian
military thought.  Moreover, Brazilian military strategists will
not have failed to note that the terms used in the NSSs are
sufficiently broad to capture a changeable range of groups
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and activities that might otherwise have been regarded in a
very different light.
US pressures for democracy
Plato observed in The Republic that “democracy pass into
despotism.”  His views on democracy are well known. For Pla-
to, democracy, and the liberty that it implicitly entails, entail
represented the triumph of libertine and demagogic excesses.
Nonetheless, his observation went well beyond his philosophi-
cal preferences: democracy, he correctly observed, was and is
most vulnerable to its own political dynamics. Polarization,
scandals, the gradual erosion of the middle ground, disillusio-
nment with its outcomes, with its distribution (or lack thereof)
of economic resources, the corrosive nature of barter politics,
crises of succession, in short, the primary “stuff” of politics,
have an erosive effect on inherently fragile democratic syste-
ms. The NSS 2006 states unequivocally that “the advance of
freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-
term solution to the transnational terrorism of today.”29  Others
have pointed to the tenuous empirical link between autocracy
and terrorism, however,30  suggesting that this is not necessa-
rily a fully candid expression of policy.
By most standards scrutinize by US policy makers, demo-
cracy in Brazil and, indeed, in Latin America, is “deepening,”
but NSS 2006 is adamant that there are three countries in Latin
America that deserve special attention in this regard:  Colom-
bia, where “a democratic ally is fighting the persistent assaults
of Marxist terrorists and drug-trafickers,” Venezuela, where “a
demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and
seeking to destabilize the region,” and Cuba, where “an anti-
American [sic.] dictator continues to oppress his people and
seeks to subvert freedom in the region.”31  Given the emphasis
in NSS 2002 and 2006 upon democracy and freedom as ma-
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rkers, along with prevention of drug trafficking and (apparen-
tly, in the Hemisphere, at least) terrorism, and growing US
emphases upon use of Latin American military establishments
as police forces in this regard,32  it is seen as odd, as Suzeley
Kalil Mathias notes, that in the meetings of the Committee on
Hemispheric Security, relatively little support has been shown
for US insistence on the assignment of police duties to Hemis-
pheric military establishments.  Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr
echoes these concerns when he notes from a military perspec-
tive that
a nova situação trazia, de uma vez por todas, a questão da Guerra
Assimétrica com suas ameaças de difícil identificação e a necessi-
dade de, cada vez mais, um trabalho conjunto entre organismos
militares e civis.  O enorme aparato e prontidão militar de nada
serviram para impedir os ataques terroristas.33
As regards the Santiago meetings in 2002, which should
have been vitally influenced by 9-11, Mathias notes that:
O tema central continuou a ser o Terrorismo e o Narcotráfico. Entre-
tanto, por não existir uma visão comum sobre a percepção e defini-
ção destas ameaças, não se atingiu o consenso buscado pelos EUA
no intuito de promover a militarização dos mesmos, o que redun-
daria na utilização das Forças Armadas em seu combate. A inclu-
são do Terrorismo e Narcotráfico como temas prioritários, mas para
os quais as respostas são múltiplas, pode ser creditada ao governo
argentino, cujo Chanceler defendeu justamente a multifacetabili-
dade destes dois temas.34
The recent definitive UNDP report on Democracy35  in Latin
America seems to reinforce the NSSs oblique characterisation
that democracy has only ambivalent majority support, that
economic opportunities are far more central to popular thou-
ght and prevailing political culture, and that there is a variety
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of factors working simultaneously in Brazil and in wider Latin
America to promote drug trafficking and terrorism and hence
to undermine the democratic swell.  According to recent UNDP
studies, such disenchantment may now characterise a signifi-
cant minority of Latin Americans, and a majority of the Brazi-
lian electorate.36  Moreover, economic development is seen as
lagging dangerously behind popular expectations, so much so,
in fact, that a recent book on the global economic crisis by a
prominent New Zealand economist is called The Democracy
Sham.37   As summarised in a UNDP report:
In 2002, 57 percent of the citizens of Latin America said that they
preferred democracy to any other system.  Of these people, however,
48.1 ranked economic development over democracy and 44.9 per-
cent said that they would be prepared to support an authoritarian
regime if it was able to resolve the country’s economic problems
(UNDP, Survey, elaboration on the basis of Latinbarómetro 2002).38
Hence, although both of the US NSSs, stress the crucial im-
portance of democracy and democratisation abroad, including
in Latin America,39  as ideological markers as to whether or
not a country is a friend or enemy in this worldwide war on
terror, and stress active combat against drug trafficking and
terrorism, active Hemispheric resistance to this police role, os-
tensibly shared by military establishments such as Brazil’s, re-
mains central.  Aside from the implied US unilateral action to
encourage democracies in Latin America,40  which would be
largely acceptable from the standpoint of the UN and internati-
onal law (although, again, there is little mention of internatio-
nal law in the first Plan, and virtually no mention of it in the
2006 version), there are implications of this external “encoura-
gement” of democracy as regards the broader issue of national
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Although Bush and his colleagues may have cynically exaggerated
the ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda, they do appear to believe
that only nondemocratic regimes, if not all nondemocratic demo-
cratic regimes, will sponsor terrorism and that without state ba-
cking, terrorism will disappear.41
The predominant alternative to democracy in Brazil, and in
Latin America, has been dictatorship.  Generally speaking, dic-
tatorships have involved the military at some stage, even when
they are not military dictatorships.  Brazil’s experience with a
21-year corporate military dictatorship (1964-85), its “bureau-
cratic authoritarian”42  phase, however, looms large as a pos-
sible alternative Brazilian model of governance.43   It is not an
exaggeration to say that senior Brazilian military officers would
be well aware of this, and are cognizant of the Brazilian
military’s reputation as well of having nuclear weapons tech-
nology, if not nuclear weapons, and hence of possibly (at some
near-future point) fitting the potential category (according to
NSS 2002 and 2006) of a future target of pre-emption, as ironic
as this may seem in historical perspective.44
The NSS emphasis on spreading democracy abroad, althou-
gh it has been revitalised and underscored, developed in fact
out of a long-term US foreign policy emphasis, and hence has a
historical entrenchment.  Beginning in the 1980s, for example,
the US Agency for International Development, USAID, a chief
foreign assistance coordinator, commissioned a study on de-
mocracy; the US State Department shifted its Cold War em-
phases from anti-communism to pro-democracy, and used this
to pressure the collapsing East Block regimes.  Old Testament-
form foreign policy associated with the Cold War (“the enemy
of my enemy is my friend”) rapidly gave way to a rather techni-
cal insistence by the US on democratic practices in a number of
countries: the creation of competitive multiparty systems, free
and fair elections, guarantees of basic human rights, and the
rule of law.
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With the collapse of the East Block in 1989-90, US policy-
makers quickly withdrew their support for long-term dictato-
rial allies.  In some cases, like that of Kenya,45   US foreign
policy quickly shifted in favour of democracy, leading to wi-
thdrawal of US foreign assistance and sudden and unexpec-
ted political reversals.46   Limited US commitment to demo-
cracy in Latin America and Africa was developing ad hoc with
the end of the Cold war, and hence was specifically qualified
and conditioned by a series of often unrelated political events.47
Increasing credence was given to the axiom in international
relations that liberal democracies do not go to war with each
other.  Then, with September 11 and the NSS documents, a
new and far stronger rationale for US insistence upon demo-
cratic governance emerged.
US pressures in support of democracy in Latin America seem
to have been determinate in some cases, although the messa-
ge is by no means unambiguous, particularly following the
publication of the US National Security Strategy of 2002.   In
that same year the US appeared to support an undemocratic
military coup attempt against an elected president (and former
military coup conspirator, himself), Hugo Chavez of Venezuela
that “demagogue awash in oil money [who] is undermining
democracy and seeking to destabilize the region,” as he is des-
cribed in NSS 2006.  during this coup attempt, Chavez was
arrested, and a civilian was sworn in as president; Chavez was
returned to power after 47 hours when his supporters were able
to retake the capital.  Significantly, the US moved with unsee-
mly haste to recognise the short lived government, and then
did not condemn the coup until well after it had failed.  Clearly,
the events associated with 9-11 had elevated US national se-
curity and “anti-terrorist” priorities to a primary level, and even
reinforced a new criterion for allocating US support and recog-
nition to Latin American governments.  In this sense, the “US
Factor” showed signs of having changed significantly, appa-
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rently no longer representing an absolute barrier to authoritari-
an (“irregular executive”) transition when democratic manda-
tes are regarded as having been abused.
The more threatening image of the US in Latin America is
less ambiguous.  The US role posited by the NSSs, and its often
confusing activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, have undermined
its claim to a more peaceful and benevolent fiduciary role.  A
number of “middle-range” powers have been imbued with an
antagonistic set of interests vis-à-vis the United States.  From
Brazil to Iran, the United States has come to be seen as a po-
tential or real “enemy,” and this may be another propel to de-
mocracy, at least insofar as the US has sporadically served as
its defender.  At the very least, and following the haphazard
coup attempt in Venezuela, it is clear that the Bush Adminis-
tration is decidedly ambivalent in its support of democracy in
Latin America, at least as a first-order priority.
National sovereignty,
nationalism and middle range powers
Beginning in the mid-1980s, tremendous energy was expen-
ded by political analysts on studies of “transitions” to demo-
cracy, reflecting in some cases an almost Nineteenth Century
concept of unilinear “progress” in their conceptualizations.
“Transitologists,” as Philippe Schmitter referred to many of
them, tended to neglect one important factor in his view:  as
Alexis de Tocqueville had observed one hundred and fifty years
earlier, “armies (in democracies) always exert a very great in-
fluence over the fate (of these polities).”48  Recent studies have
reflected a far more cautious and circumspect view, given the
broad spectrum of nationalist and ethnic conflicts that have
occurred over the past decade. Many observers, in fact, have
dusted off their old texts on nationalism as the levels of natio-
nalist rhetoric, and outbursts of nationalistic and ethnic vio-
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lence continue to occur. The Brazilian military establishment
is, by dint of its fundamental role in Brazilian society, a natio-
nalistic organisation.
What is Nationalism? Broadly defined, it is an assemblage
of ideologies, a family of ideologies, rather than a single, dis-
crete ideological adaptation, although it is always recogniza-
ble as nationalism per se; it is constructed around a national
ideal, “that all those who [share] a common history and cultu-
re should be autonomous, united and distinct in their recogni-
zed homelands.”49  The concept of sovereignty, particular cruci-
al this case, is thought to derive directly from “the neoclassi-
cal, secular ideal of assimilation,” a conviction that is said to
“take much of its inspiration from the political passion and
activist fervor of the polis tradition.”50  A decade-old extreme
right-wing analysis of US threats to Brazilian (and wider Latin
American) national sovereignty by an American extremist or-
ganization,51  thought to have been very popular reading on Latin
American military bases over the last 13 years in its Portugue-
se and Spanish translations,52  makes the argument against
democracy,53  and apparently for something very much like na-
tional socialism (fascism), in a way that is seen to feed very
effectively on Latin American military fears regarding US (and
hence international banking conspiracy) limitations on Brazili-
an national sovereignty.
Sovereignty would appear to base its claims primarily upon
history, upon the record of a national population living in a ter-
ritory. Hence another dilemma of the Brazilian nationalists is
that sovereignty over Amazônia, given its historical record as a
“hollow frontier” (much of it has always been virtually unpopu-
lated)54  is particularly dependent upon international agreements
and international law; nonetheless, the nationalist gritos of most
strident nationalists over the past five years, and certainly of
senior military officers such as Brigadier Sérgio Ferolla,55  con-
sistently deny the validity of international consensus as it ap-
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plies to Amazônia.  The US NSSs, moreover, seem to support
this principal of national sovereignty, but only as regards the
United States.
In the post-Cold War era, the most effective use of nationa-
list appeals has seemed to involve middle-level powers. With
the unchallenged military and economic primacy of the United
States, and the rapid decline, or continuing slow development,
of other potential “superpowers” (e.g., Russia and China), a
potentially new era of “sorting out” has apparently begun. Coun-
tries such as Iraq, Iran, and Yugoslavia (greater Serbia) have
been characterized as “rogue-state” nations. Other middle-le-
vel powers, Indonesia and Yugoslavia, for example, have stru-
ggled with nationalist appeals to maintain their national form
and integrity in the face of separatist claims.
Brazilian military thought, as the reigning justification of
the defenders of a middle-level power, has been impacted by
these developments in at least two ways:  first, for a variety of
reasons Brazil has occasionally maintained close ties, inclu-
ding close military ties, with some of the so-called “rogue
states.” An interesting example of this is the case of its close
military ties to Iraq during the Gulf War of the early 1990s.
Second, as an aspiring middle level power, Brazil has become
directly involved in international competitions for political in-
clusion. Competition for a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council is one example of this. In both of these categories, the
experiences of the Brazilian military establishment point to
frustrations, and, often, open dissatisfaction with the interna-
tional order.
The vulnerability of the Brazilian military officer corps to
nationalistic arguments can be summarized briefly as follows:
first, the relative paucity over the past century of what might be
termed as “orthodox” military missions has meant that, from
mission and budgetary standpoints, the Brazilian armed forces
have frequently felt threatened. Second, as one of the most sta-
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ble and professional national institutions historically, the mili-
tary has often evinced broad popular support, particularly when
it has been seen as standing for the national interests. Third,
and not unrelated to the second, repeated pressures from civi-
lians on the military to intervene in the political processes have,
on a number of historical occasions, put the military in a pre-
carious and politically vulnerable position, and ultimately led
to the 21-year military intervention, 1964-1985.56  The respon-
se of Brazilian military officers is clearly conditioned by Brazil’s
status as an aspiring middle-level power, or what Maria Regi-
na Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst have called a “middle
ground international role.”57  The military has been directly in-
volved in heavy industry, in international peacekeeping, and in
exercising control over the vast Amazon region.  Moreover, offi-
cers reflect the national frustration with the post-Cold War
worldwide economy, in which some countries appear to be re-
legated to a semi-permanent “have-not” status.
Particularly interesting is the military establishment’s dilem-
ma involving property rights. As the guarantor of sovereignty
in Amazônia (and the largest “landholder” in Brazil), and as a
frequent police force opposing the land occupations of the Lan-
dless Movement (MST), the Brazilian military has long been
arrayed with the most uncompromising advocates of unres-
tricted property ownership.  On the other hand, senior military
officers have supported calls for the broad-scale occupation of
Amazônia, the full implications of which would ultimately in-
volve compromising huge tracts of private, or privately contro-
lled land. Moreover, in the case of some stridently nationalistic
officers, the lesson that unrestricted property ownership tends
to perpetuate extreme inequality,58  and hence underdevelop-
ment, is not lost. This dilemma played itself out in the 1960s
and 1970s, when a number of authoritarian nationalist officers
in the Brazilian military gravitated eventually toward much
more liberal and populist positions.59
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FURTHER BACKGROUND TO POSSIBLE
BRAZILIAN MILITARY THOUGHT: GROWING FEAR
AND SUSPICION OF US INTENTIONS IN THE 1990S
The increasing emphasis in the George H.W. Bush adminis-
tration upon the “New World Order” appears to have intensified
deep suspicion in the Brazilian military establishment.  Within
a short period, an open military dialogue on the post-Cold War
international situation led to the adoption of a position that
has been characterized as one of “pure realism,”60  as opposed
to the modified and more “global” realism of the late Cold War
period.61   The words of Admiral Vidigal perhaps best express
this interpretation in a context that relates directly to the 2002
and 2006 US documents:
The basic principles that governed international relations up to the
Gulf War–non-intervention and self-determination [italics in the ori-
ginal]–are, in the contemporary world, ignored by the great powers
that preach intervention, provided that, in their exclusive estimate,
there is a risk to democracy, a grave violation of human rights, the
possibility of an ecological tragedy, a threat to peace, or any other
noble reason that the idealists of the planet can find at the opportu-
ne moment.62
In the face of these new perceived threats, strategic analy-
ses, which previously (and invariably) began with a reaffirma-
tion of the Soviet threat, have now come to emphasize the risks
to the independence, self-determination, autonomy and terri-
torial integrity of the middle-range powers. Typical of this shift
in concerns, General Leonel presented the following topics in
the opening class of the Superior War College in Rio de Janeiro
in early 1996: “1) Change in the 21st Century: Repercussions in
the Military Sphere; 2) Sovereignty; 3) The New Threats to the
Sovereignty of States; 4) The Phenomenon of War.”  Significan-
tly, these topics were covered in the course before turning to
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the Brazilian national situation.63  In the same summary of the
course, General Leonel refered to the “notable” personalities
outside of Brazil who “have come to qualify sovereignty, in ac-
cordance with their interests, as ‘limited sovereignty,’ ‘restric-
ted,’ [and] ‘shared,’ and have accepted the ‘right of interferen-
ce,’ [and] ‘humanitarian intervention,’ expressions that have
become common, and that bring with them effects that are
undesirable for some countries in the absence of the right of
tutelary power.”64
In a lecture delivered at the Second Meeting on Strategic Stu-
dies, held at the University of São Paulo in 1995, Leonel was
already referring to “the asymmetry of economic power” as a
generator of regional disparities and poverty, which ultimately
resulted in insecurity.65   In the face of such threats, he stressed
that “Brazil possesses assets essential to watch over [zelar]–
its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and its national unity.”
He concluded that “sovereignty is characterized by being one,
indivisible, inalienable and non-prescriptive.”66  It is significant
that such public and official declarations by high-ranking offi-
cers are typically restrained, cautious and characterized by
implicit, rather than explicit, comments. As noted below, infor-
mal statements by Brazilian military officers, both active and
in the reserves, on this theme tend to express these same vi-
ews, although far more explicitly.
The insistence upon the threats and risks imposed upon
Brazilian national sovereignty by the asymmetry in North-Sou-
th relations has become a common concern in military analy-
ses after 1991. In the economic sphere, commercial margina-
lization and technological isolation have been mentioned fre-
quently. In the political sphere, the North American anti-drug
strategy, which has opened a path for the principle of extra-
territoriality (supported by the US Supreme Court), likewise
figures prominently. The recent rise of environmental questi-
ons to a level of key concern on the part of wealthy nations is
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seen as threatening Brazil’s eventual development policies with
a debate over ecology, which may curb economic activities
that the most industrialized countries regard as destructive to
the environment.67
Concern with US disregard for Brazilian national sovereign-
ty was expressed clearly by Brigadier General Sérgio Xavier
Ferolla in an interview in 1998.68   According to the former head
of the Brazilian Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff and the founder of
Embraer, who was able, as a Military Supreme Court Justice to
speak on political issues (in other words, not bound by the RDA),
the ‘enemy’ of Brazil was “the Northern Hemisphere, princi-
pally the United States.” Moreover, in his opinion, the support
of the UN could not legitimise multinational intervention such
as occurred in the First Gulf War, because the Security Council
was “dominated by five countries which determine what others
should do.”69
The potential threat to the Amazon may loom as a central
concern of Brazilian military thought as regards the US NSSs.
The Brazilian military has long insisted that its authority in the
vast Brazilian Amazon region must be unqualified. By the 1950s,
the region’s geopolitical implications, and particularly its “na-
tural permeability,” were employed by General Golbery do Cou-
to e Silva to argue in favor of its extensive colonization and
national integration.70  Since the end of the Cold War, such con-
cerns have tangibly intensified,71  and been directed outwards
towards, for example, NGOs and foreign powers.  Ecological
catastrophe in the Amazon region is a commonly painted sce-
nario regarding such intervention. Madeline Albright was quo-
ted in the Brazilian press in 2001 as having remarked that “As
to the question of the environment, there are no frontiers.”72  As
Admiral Vidigal put it,
It is not absurd to imagine that, in a future that is not distant, inter-
national forces under the aegis of the United Nations, would be used
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to “avoid an ecological catastrophe,” such as, for example, the ‘de-
vastation” of the Amazon forest.73
In probing the anthropological implications of the term “na-
tion,” Brazilian military officers have decided that an eventual
“ecological” conflict, such as between an indigenous nation and
the Brazilian nation, would open a space for such a possible
international intervention in Brazil.74  It would now appear that
“terrorism” and threats of terrorism could do so as well. US
concerns with the Colombian guerrilla group, FARC, have di-
rectly impacted Brazilian military operations over the past de-
cade, for example. In March, 1998, during a crisis stemming
from huge forest fires in Roraima, the Commander of the First
Forest Infantry Brigade, General Luiz Edmundo Carvalho, de-
clared to the press that he rejected any possibility of foreign
assistance in combating the fires.75  This position created diffi-
culties for the federal government, which was preoccupied at
the time with limiting the negative foreign repercussions from
the destruction of the forest.76  Interestingly, the presidential
spokesman limited himself to commenting that General Car-
valho had been the victim of a misunderstanding.77  The Brazi-
lian press attacked senior officers for their inopportune insis-
tence upon this nationalistic gesture, however.78
The intensity of military thought in this regard was evident
in its adoption by a civilian president, one of Brazil’s most no-
ted intellectuals. In a speech commemorating promoted gene-
rals in 1999, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso responded
openly and defensively to putative threats of foreign military
intervention in Amazônia, implying that he was responding to
statements by US authorities. The tenor of the speech clearly
countered the general feeling of cooperation between the Car-
doso and Clinton administrations, which had included new
military contacts.  Cardoso had decided that the armed forces
would give support to the Federal Police operations against
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narcotics trafficking in Amazônia, a response, according to news
reports at the time, to a personal appeal from Clinton.79  Later
Cardoso referred specifically to a speech given at MIT by Gene-
ral Patrick Hughes, Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy, where he was said to have commented that “in the case
that Brazil decides to make use of the Amazon [in a way] that
puts the environment of the United States at risk, we have to be
ready to interrupt this process immediately.”80   While subse-
quent official notes denied that this statement had ever been
made, it is interesting that the president of Brazil risked provo-
king a diplomatic incident in order to respond to this nationa-
listic Brazilian military concern, especially coming so soon af-
ter the Roraima fire.
Additional possible areas of concern
as the brazilian military imagines the future
Brazilian diplomatic policy has long involved paying careful
attention to US policy.  Part of this stems from the growing
national aspirations to major middle-range power status, in-
cluding at some point in the future acquisition of a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council. US watching, however, goes
far beyond this. As Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica
Hirst have noted, “Brazil keeps a permanent watch on the Uni-
ted States and what it does in world politics, and its foreign
policy decisions consistently involve an assessment of the costs
and benefits of convergence with or divergence from the US.”81
Brazilian military focus upon US policy is clearly conditioned
by such concerns as weapons acquisitions. It was recently ob-
served, for example, that Brazil’s largest diplomatic corps in
Washington is in the Air Force mission, which reportedly has
three times the staff of that of the Brazilian Embassy!82
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THE DEMOCRACY QUESTION (AGAIN)
There are disquieting signals, however, that US pressures
putatively in support of democracy, particularly in the National
Security Strategies, may actually be working directly against
support for democracy in the military thought of countries like
Brazil. It must be stressed that the NSSs in no way suggest
that force should be used to implement democracy.83  However,
by stressing the importance of the National Security State, for
example, a term that is very familiar to Brazilians, the NSSs
appear to be sending a mixed message as regards democrati-
sation. As Daniel Cruz de Andrade Flôr, of the Brazilian Navy,
put it in 2004:
É com esse pensamento que a nação norte-americana apoiando-
se numa retórica de disseminar os ideais de democracia e da liber-
dade vai, ao longo da toda sua história, justificar iniciativas expan-
sionistas, imperialistas e intervencionistas não somente como um
dever, mas também um direito divino.84
Pressures for democratisation, in this lens, represent direct
challenges to the national sovereignty of Brazil. This obvious-
ly complicates military thought regarding the near future. The
military established the NS State in Brazil, the central artefact
of political concepts of national sovereignty in Brazil, and did
have limited societal support for it during specific junctures,
although there is abundant evidence of its early loss of popu-
lar support after 1964.  Hence, while it is true that some parts
of the Brazilian middle class, for example, supported the mili-
tary intervention in 1964, it is also true that the collective mi-
ddle classes rapidly turned against dictatorship, and in favour
of democracy.85
Brazil’s transition to Democracy after 1985 was painfully
slow and deliberate.  Because of the untimely death of Presi-
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dent-Elect Tancredo Neves in 1985, the first civilian president
after the dictatorship, José Sarney, was a conservative who had
been closely associated with the military government.  Little
was done to redress the excesses of military dictatorship.86  The
first decade of the new democracy was dominated by crippling
inflation.  Moreover, the new constitution that was drafted in
1988 enshrined some of the “military prerogatives” that had
represented the persistence of authoritarianism in Brazil, in-
cluding half a dozen military places in the presidential cabi-
net.87  The first direct election brought to power a president,
Fernando Collor de Mello, who had been closely associated with
the military government, and who, despite his clear break with
the military, was quickly impeached88  and removed from office
because of corruption.  His successor, Vice-President Itamar
Franco, was likewise dominated by civilian and military elite
demands, although by the end of his presidential term, his Fi-
nance Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, managed to in-
troduce a new currency and stabilise the economy, and inflati-
on was effectively eliminated.
Cardoso, previously a famous leftist sociologist, was sub-
sequently elected president and directed a stabilising (con-
servative) administration that emphasised economic growth
while only very gradually and carefully reducing the power and
influence of the military.  In particular, the creation of a civili-
an-directed intelligence agency, Abin, and a civilian-directed
Ministry of Defense, both near the end of his second adminis-
tration, represented major democratising accomplishments.
Nonetheless, major high-level political scandals, a significant
breakdown in personal security (widespread urban crime, pri-
marily) and open conflict with the Landless Movement (and
other groups) lowered the popularity of his government, and
of democracy in general, as revealed at the time by major sam-
ple surveys.
With the election of Luís Inácio (Lula) da Silva, leader of the
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Workers’ Party (PT) in 2002, the stage was set for direct con-
frontation with economic elites over fundamental questions of
economic democracy. Instead, Lula has also pursued stabili-
sation policies and has been beset by high-level political/eco-
nomic scandals.89  The economy continues to grow, and hence
his popularity has remained relatively high, but as the UNDP
report on democracy demonstrated, popular support for demo-
cracy may be waning significantly in Brazil.90   Brazil has long
had a dramatic and growing disparity between its rich and
poor.91   Its democratic processes are now struggling to deal
with a crisis in property ownership, a direct result of this. The
Landless Movement (MST) and Homeless Movement (MTST)
have increasingly moved to expropriate property holdings,
making their case in terms of justice and fairness, so much so
that the Workers’ Party Government, headed by President Lula,
is at odds with them after working closely with them for nearly
two decades.  However, the “problems from below” for Lula’s
government go well beyond the MST.  His much heralded “Fome
Zero” (Zero Hunger) programme, a commitment in 2002 to rid
Brazil of hunger within four years,92  has encountered serious
political and economic obstacles despite continuing economic
growth and relatively positive tax receipts. The military is inva-
riably drawn into this kind of conflict and it will be direct a
concern in the formulation of Brazilian military thought over
the next several years.
The 2004 UNDP report, Democracy in Latin America; To-
wards a Citizens’ Democracy,93  a comprehensive and multifa-
ceted survey research exploring citzens’ attitudes toward de-
mocracy and democratic process, revealed that the “Democra-
tic Wave” of democracy in Latin America has crested, at least
as regards popular support for, and commitment to, continua-
tion of democratic processes. Brazil has been especially no-
teworthy in this regard, with strikingly non-democratic per-
centages indicated by the random surveys. Voting behaviour
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also emphasises this point. Voting is compulsory in Brazil, and
92.4% of those with the right to vote register; 75.9% of those
with the right to vote actually vote, still a very high percentage,
but clearly dictated by the legal requirement to vote.  However,
only 54.6 percent of those qualified to vote cast valid votes,94
with many voters either turning in a blank ballot, or ruining
their ballot in some way.
Coupled with democratic disenchantment is romanticism
regarding the past. Military officers have once again become
the most admired professional category in Brazil, and nostal-
gic feelings for the military presidency of Ersnesto Geisel (1972-
79) were apparently evident as early as 1989.95
Social insecurity
The profound and growing personal insecurity in Brazil is
part of a region-wide pattern that has followed collapsing eco-
nomies and infrastructures, desperate attempts by economic
elites to retain their privileges, the rapid growth of drug traffi-
cking, and pervasive corruption. Social insecurity is most stri-
dently felt among the middle classes, and typically revolves
around security of private property. As José Nun observed in the
mid-1960s, it is the interests of the middle classes that are
best represented by, and hence seem to trigger, military coups.96
The military is increasingly called upon to engage in police ac-
tions in Rio de Janeiro and other major Brazilian cities. This
inevitable confusion of identities invariably corrupts the missi-
on, if not the personnel, of the military establishment.
Social capital, popularising democracy
The findings of Robert Putnam’s path breaking work, Bo-
wling Alone,97  can be interpolated to cast the Brazilian Politi-
cal system in a very favourable light.  While, as Putnam de-
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monstrates, voluntary organisation in the form of “social capi-
tal,” the basis of democratic governance, is in dramatic decline
in the US, since the early 1970s there has been an unpreceden-
ted growth of grass-roots voluntary associations in Brazil, many
of which have directly democratic aims.98   This accelerated
growth of “social capital” clearly represents a barrier to autho-
ritarian designs.   As Huntington observed in The Third Wave,
Over the course of a decade, from 1974 to 1984, the Brazilian gover-
nment regularly revised its laws on elections, parties, and campaig-
ning in hopes of stopping the steady growth of opposition power.  It
did not succeed.  Again the evidence is fragmentary, but what there
is does suggest that, unless they were carried to an extreme, rigging
tactics were unlikely to ensure government victory.99
Putnam is perhaps more clear in his argument that “the he-
alth of our public institutions depends, at least in part, on wi-
despread participation in private voluntary groups—those ne-
tworks of civic engagement that embody social capital.”100
Implications of the breakdown
of absolute property rights
There may be a connection between the progressive breakdo-
wn of unlimited property rights and a greater tendency toward
military intervention in Brazil.101   MST and MTST, for example,
directly challenge not only the political order that has underwrit-
ten military structure, but threaten Brazil’s largest landowner,
the Brazilian Armed Forces. For many Brazilians, the prospect
of political democracy in 1985 had represented economic de-
mocracy, and continuing economic deprivation spells disillusi-
onment with the electoral system. Occupation of lands and
buildings is often described by the wealthy as “terrorism,” a
message that is not lost on North American authors of the NSSs.
Lula, now an international socialist leader, finds himself in the
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difficult position of having to defend bourgeois representative
(and global) democracy, private property ownership and the
rule of oligarchic law against ever more strident demands from
within his coalition for economic democracy as a primary goal.
And US concern with the “terrorist” implications of limited pro-
perty rights will inevitably be seen as a threatening develop-
ment by military elite.
Political popularity of the military
In many Latin American countries, according to the recent
UNDP survey data, democracy is losing popular support, mos-
tly because of its failure thus far to deliver economic prosperity
to most of the population, but also because of  other factors,
including social insecurity, growing ideological polarization,
high level corruption, and so on. In many of the same countri-
es, the military has once again become the most respected
national institution, almost irrespective of an individual’s ideo-
logical persuasion, soaring above legislatures, presidencies,
courts, other bureaucratic entities, private corporations, etc. in
survey responses.102
The military is pressed for a variety of reasons to encoura-
ge a narrow brand of nationalism, and to adopt special cau-
ses, such as “saving” the Amazon region from putative fo-
reign threats.103   In practice, this has led to a more authorita-
rian presence of the military in that region,104  and ultimately
to the preservation of interventionist tendencies based upon
claims of “national security.”  However, it also reinserts the
military in the role of national political mediator, a role that
has been reflected in the sharp growth of the Brazilian milita-
ry as political actors.  Moreover, the Brazilian Armed Forces
are increasingly seen as pitted directly against the implied
political intervention in Brazilian affairs, if not national sove-
reignty, represented by the NSSs.
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Brazilian borders and national security
Brazilian concern with its borders, and particularly with
Colombia’s inability to resolve its civil war (and the implicati-
ons for the entire Amazon region that this poses), is unfortuna-
tely highlighted in the NSSs.  Hence, although
…for over 100 years Brazil has considered itself a ‘geographi-
cally satisfied’ country and, in marked contrast to other states
in the region, its state-building process has been the result of
successful diplomatic negotiation rather than engagement in
military disputes,105
it can also be affirmed that “Brazil understands the proble-
ms of regional security very differently from the Uribe govern-
ment and fears the consequences of Colombia’s clear align-
ment with the United States.”106   A multiplicity of specific bor-
der concerns have arisen over the past two decades, including
Brazilian military mobilisation in response to US-Guyana war
games in the early 1990s and rumours of US designs on Ama-
zônia.  The relative failure of SIVAM and Calha Norte, incursi-
ons by FARC, indeed, US drug patrols and anti-drug operati-
ons, have all conspired to produce a climate that can only be
interpreted by future Brazilian military thought as threatening
to national sovereignty.
Nationalism
Brazilian nationalism has soared to new heights in the last
decade, initially designed in the 1970s by the military dictator-
ship, fuelled by subsequent soccer and sports victories and dra-
matic economic growth, and focused in recent years, as just
noted, by paranoia involving putative sovereignty threats to the
Amazon region. “A Amazônia é nossa,” (The Amazon is ours),
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has assumed international proportions at times, and has peri-
odically reinforced election campaigns. Recent declarations by
senior military officers that the US has designs on the Amazon
region, and that it is the likely future “enemy” of Brazil, give a
particular shade to this nationalistic fervour. Brazilian natio-
nalism will inevitably run counter to the US intervention that is
part and parcel of the War on Terror. An interesting example
involves US concerns with the putative presence of Islamic
fundamentalism in the Foz de Iguaçu area, and the implicati-
ons that this may have for foreign incursions on Brazilian soil.
Anti - “americanism”
As noted above, a growing level of anti-Americanism in Bra-
zil may represent an interesting influence on future Brazilian
military thought as regards the preservation of democracy in
Brazil, with similar implications in the rest of Latin America.
When the US is portrayed, accurately or not, as an anti-demo-
cratic actor, this might actually fuel a level of enthusiasm for
democracy, although not necessarily the global economic mo-
del of democracy that has been central to the “Bush Doctrine.”
While the NSSs devote a good deal of space in pressing for glo-
bal democracy, the “Bush Doctrine” that they have spawned is
generally regarded as anti-democratic, from the “rendition” and
torture of prisoners, and the use of Guantanamo Bay, to the
struggles with external implementation of democratic regimes
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, there is growing evidence in
the NSSs of striking disagreement as to the characterisation of
regimes as “democratic” and non-democratic” (viz., Hugo Chá-
vez). Brazilian military concern with US responses to “anti-
Yankee” sentiment in these regards may well condition milita-
ry thought regarding Brazilian politics into the next decade.
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CONCLUSION
It would be facile and inaccurate to assume a major impact
of the NSSs on Brazilian politics in the near future. Brazil has
remained largely untouched by these policy declarations. Inde-
ed, analysts are increasingly concluding that US-Latin Ameri-
can relations, with the possible exceptions of relations with
Venezuela, Cuba and Colombia,107  are unlikely to be transfor-
mative.  As Abraham Lowenthal recently concluded,
Neither strong US-Latin American partnership nor profound US-La-
tin American hostility is likely to prevail.  Relations between the
United States and Latin America during the next few years are likely
to remain complex, multifaceted and contradictory.108
Nonetheless, the NSSs represent a growing US trend as re-
gards the national sovereignty of other countries, and national
sovereignty remains the fundamental raison d’être of national
armed forces.  As Vice-Admiral Vidigal remarked in 2003,
O que é específico da Doutrina Bush é o nível atual do poder nacio-
nal dos Estados Unidos, sem contraponto moderador, o que dá a
ela acentuado conteúdo de realpolitik, apenas disfarçado com um
discurso messiânico. No fundo, a Doutrina Bush reflete um profun-
do desprezo pelos interesses e receios dos demais países—ou eles
se aliam incondicionalmente com a América ou são considerados
inimigos e são tratados como tal. Esta é a forma mais perversa de
isolacionismo.109
Hence, it is clear that the NSSs will continue to exert some
influence on the development of Brazilian military thought, if
only in a strident objection to the untenable choices that it im-
poses upon all middle-range powers.
Imagining Brazilian military thought in the near future ulti-
mately yields a melange of perceptions deeply influenced by
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Brazil’s pretensions to major regional power status, growing
world status, socio-economic struggles at home, and persis-
tent threats to its national sovereignty. The Brazilian military
has simply not been concerned in the past with terrorism.110
Now their thought may be conditioned as never before to exa-
mine such categories, and possible US responses to them, in
the context of world and regional politics.  As Soares de Lima
and Hirst have concluded, “Brazil faces major challenges ahe-
ad.  Never before have internal and international developments
been as closely intertwined as they are at present.”111
Brazilian military thought will continue to interpret the “Bush
Doctrine” and the National Security Strategies from the stan-
dpoint of a middle-range power, and through the dual lenses of
national sovereignty and international law.  On both scores,
the Strategies are sorely lacking.  As Daniel Cruz de Andrade
Flôr, of the Brazilian Escola Naval, wrote in 2004 regarding the
first National Security Strategy,
A Estratégia de Segurança Nacional implementada por George Bush
não passa, então, de mais uma tentativa dos Estados Unidos de
manter sua hegemonia mundial.  Seu caráter unilateral vem so-
mente reafirmar o que mais de um século de relações internacio-
nais mostrou: Os Estados Unidos agirão onde quiserem e quando
for interessante para suas ambições políticas e econômicas.112
In the face of such open suspicion, and in the complete pau-
city of consultation, it is difficult to see how the full goals of the
US National Security Strategies can ever be regarded by the
Brazilian Armed Forces as an acceptable basis for a cordial
alliance. In the end, Brazilian military thought will continue
(and must continue) to reflect the fundamental concerns of Bra-
zilian national sovereignty, the space for which seems wholly
lacking in the National Security Strategies (2002, 2006) of the
United States of America.
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